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Abstract 
 
                We used extensions of traditional ARCH and GARCH models to examine the 
difference in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during 
collusion and the absence of it using prices from two recently discovered conspiracies, 
citric acid and lysine. According to our results, the citric acid conspiracy increased prices 
by 9 cents per pound relative to pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The lysine conspiracy 
managed to raise prices by 25 cents per pound. In addition, the variance of prices during 
the lysine conspiracy was lower than the variance of prices during pre-cartel and post-cartel 
periods as we expected. In contrast, the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy 
was higher relative to more competitive periods.  
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Introduction 
During recent decades collusive behavior has been the primary focus of many theoretical 
and empirical studies in both economics and law. Changes in antitrust legislation of many 
countries created additional incentives for research analyzing overt collusive conduct. A 
considerable number of theoretical studies concentrated on mathematical derivations of 
conditions characterizing collusive behavior under different assumptions. Over time, more 
data became available from court records, uncovered cartels that had terminated earlier, 
and different public sources. Researchers in the rapidly developing area of empirical 
industrial organization used available data and new econometric techniques to study cartels 
behavior and test hypotheses formulated in the theoretical literature. Still there remain 
many determinants and effects of collusive behavior to be studied and analyzed.  
Different empirical studies have analyzed numerous aspects of collusive behavior 
such as price and output strategies, price wars, duration, stability, profitability, 
effectiveness, and impact on the market and consumer behavior. Our study belongs to the 
group of research investigating the impact of collusive conduct on the market price 
behavior. Our objective is to use econometric techniques to analyze the impact of collusion 
on the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution, the mean and the 
variance. We hypothesize that the first two moments of prices under successful collusion 
are different than during non-collusive periods.  In particular, the mean price is higher and 
the variance of the price is lower during collusion in comparison with the period when 
there is no collusion. To test the hypotheses we use price data from two recently discovered 
conspiracies, citric acid and lysine, and employ an extension of the traditional 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalized ARCH (GARCH) 
models.    4 
The hypothesized changes in the first two moments of the price distribution may 
indicate the presence of collusive behavior in certain situations. The proposed econometric 
procedure may be used by antitrust and competition authorities to screen firm conduct. In 
addition, it may also be used as an alternative to the econometric models commonly 
employed in court proceedings to quantify the effect of conspiracy on market price. An 
advantage of using the ARCH and GARCH models is that they may use a relatively small 
sample of prices for a cartelized product before, during and after a hypothesized or known 
conspiracy.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Theoretical background and hypotheses are 
presented in the next section followed by a section discussing empirical models. Next, the 
data set description is presented, and the last section includes discussion of results and 
conclusions. 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Cartels, groups of independent companies binding themselves with an agreement on prices 
or quantities, are more likely to operate in heavily concentrated or oligopolistic markets. In 
most cases cartels are self-enforced agreements, and these may be legal or illegal. 
Assuming that the behavior of the firms acting in oligopolistic markets is profit 
maximizing, they have an incentive to collude in order to increase their joint level of profit 
(Stigler, 1961 and 1964). If their collusion is successful, the collusive firms may achieve a 
monopolistic level of profit if they manage to act as a multiplant monopolist
1. According to 
microeconomic theory, firms may achieve this goal by reducing output, which results in an 
increase in the market price. In practice, the firms may control output, prices, or both. In 
terms of practical implementation the easiest strategy to use is price control (Stigler, 1961). 
                                                
1 The first order maximization condition outcomes are the same for a multiplant monopolist and for a cartel 
(proved in Besanko and Braeutigam, 2001).   5 
The output control strategy may also be easy to employ, but the actions would be too 
revealing to antitrust authorities.  
As it turns out not all cartels pursue joint profit maximization by means of a direct 
price increase as the main strategy. Another strategy is to reduce the variance of prices by 
homogenizing firms’ business practices as in the case of the Sugar Institute (Genesove and 
Mullin, 2001). A reduction in price variance could lead to an increase in the joint profits of 
colluding firms as well. Finally, colluding firms may implement a cost efficiency strategy 
as in the case of some Webb-Pomerene export cartels (Dick 1996a and 1996b).  
In general, both legal and illegal cartels are self-enforced agreements
2. Success of 
collusive agreements depends on two major factors. These are the ability of a cartel to 
effectively enforce its discipline and the market environment the cartel operates in, i.e. 
market supply and demand conditions. Failure to enforce a collusive agreement effectively 
(i.e. quickly detect deviators, punish them and prevent opportunistic behavior in the future) 
often leads to termination of a collusive agreement. Also, changing market conditions such 
as new entry or demand or supply shocks may break an existing cartel. As it was shown in 
the theoretical and empirical literature, a large demand shock creates incentives for cartel 
members to deviate from the established discipline (Porter (1983), Green and Porter 
(1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Ellison (1994)). This usually results in a price war 
or in termination of collusion accompanied by a decrease in the market price to a more 
competitive level.  
The opportunistic behavior of cartel members, also known as cheating in the cartel 
literature, is a major problem in effective enforcement of cartel discipline. Deviators do not 
rigorously follow established price discipline and sell the product for lower prices than 
required by the collusive agreement. A deviator seeks to increase its individual profit. Also, 
                                                
2 For example, Webb-Pomerene cartels were legal cartels. They operated under the umbrella of the Webb-
Pomerene Export Trade Act, but were self-enforced agreements. Thus, they faced the same problems with the 
enforcement of cartel discipline as illegal cartels.    6 
buyers may provoke opportunistic behavior of the cartel’s members. A large buyer 
searching for big discounts may increase an incentive to deviate. The search cost for buyers 
in markets with few sellers is relatively low.  An incentive to deviate always exists as long 
as it potentially guarantees higher individual profit. The deviators are also aware of the 
possible cost of their behavior, which is punishment if their actions are revealed to other 
members. This cost approximately equals to the probability of being detected by other 
members multiplied by the probability of being punished by them if they decide to do this 
and the expected cost of punishment. Other members may detect opportunistic behavior if 
their market shares start shrinking. They may decide not to punish because this could result 
in a decrease of the cartel profit. If they decide to punish, it usually comes in the form of 
price war, “tit-for-tat” strategy of other members, or termination of collusion. Given that 
opportunistic behavior of cartel members is common, short-run individual benefits of 
deviators often outweigh the expected losses.     
In summary, rigorously followed cartel discipline may result in a price increase and 
variance decrease. As firms start following the established price discipline, the variance of 
prices tends to decrease in comparison with the non-collusive period. It is more challenging 
to control the variance of prices, although it would generate additional profits for the cartel. 
Collusion is more common in homogeneous product market where it is easier for firms to 
monitor prices. However, heterogeneity of contract conditions such as quantity discounts, 
delivery terms, and interest may introduce additional variability in prices of homogenous 
products. Also, the participants of collusive agreements may intentionally use contract 
conditions to deviate in order to obtain extra profit. Thus, different strategies of 
opportunistic behavior may contribute additional variability in prices.  
Our study analyzes two uncovered conspiracies that are known to be successful. 
Our first hypothesis relates to the mean price behavior. We expect that the mean price   7 
during collusion is higher than the mean price when there is no collusion. The price 
increase follows from the profit-maximization conditions on the concentrated markets. Our 
second hypothesis relates to the variance behavior. We expect that the variance of prices 
during successful collusion (i.e. when most of the members in most of the time follow 
established price discipline and the cartel may effectively address opportunistic behavior of 
its members) is lower than the variance of prices when there is no collusion. Our 
hypotheses are formulated under the assumption that there is no significant change in the 
market environment of the cartel that could introduce an additional shock to prices.   
 
Empirical Model 
To examine the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution, mean and 
variance, we employ an econometric procedure that allows simultaneous analysis of the 
mean and the variance. In this section we discuss the AR(m), ARCH(m), and GARCH 
(m,r) models that we use in our analysis. An autoregressive process of order m, denoted 
AR(m), for an observable variable Y in period t is represented as: 
Yt   =  c + φ1Yt-1 + φ2Yt-2 +…+  φmYt-m  +  ut                                                                                     (1) 
where ut is a white noise: 
E(ut)=0,                                                                                                                 (2)   
            E(utus)=σ² for t=s, and 0 otherwise.                                                                      (3)   
Condition (3) implies that the unconditional variance of ut is the constant σ², and the 
conditional variances could change over time. The square of ut  itself may follow an AR(m) 
process: 
 u²t  =  ζ  +  α1 u²t-1 +  α2 u²t-2 +…+  αm u²t-m + wt                                                 (4) 
where  wt is a new white noise process:          
             E(wt)=0                                                                                                                (5)   8 
             E(wtws)= λ²  for t=s, and 0 otherwise.                                                                 (6)  
A noise process ut  satisfying the variance equation (4) is described as an 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic process of order m, denoted as ARCH(m).   
The sufficient stationarity (regularity) condition requires ζ >0 and αj ≥0 for all j ≤ m. This 
class of models was introduced by Engle (1982). The ARCH(m) specification can be 
considered as an AR(m) process for u²t  (Hamilton, 1994).  
Generalized ARCH (GARCH) type models are extensions of ARCH type models. 
The GARCH(r,m) variance equation is represented by (7): 
 ht = k  + δ1ht-1 + δ2h t-2 +…+  δrht-r + α1 u²t- 1+ α2 u²t-2 +…+ αm u²t-m                 (7) 
where  ut  =  t h  v t and  vt  is i.i.d with mean zero and unit variance. The sufficient 













α  ≤ 1.  Calculation of the sequence of conditional variances {ht} for t=1 to 
t=T requires their pre-sample values. Usually they are calculated as a sample average of the 
squared predicted residuals for each pre-sample observation in the T sequence (Bollerslev 
(1996), Hamilton (1994)).  
We estimate extensions of traditional ARCH(m) and GARCH(m,r) models to 
analyze the mean and the variance behavior in our study. To test whether the mean price 
and its variance during a conspiracy differ from the mean price and the variance when there 
is no conspiracy, we introduce a conspiracy dummy variable in the models. It is 
incorporated both in the mean and the variance equations to control for the shift in their 
behavior between collusive and non-collusive regimes. The exact specification of each 
model is presented in the tables with the estimation results in the appendix.   9 
Data and Descriptive Statistic Analysis 
Citric Acid
3. We use the citric acid prices reported by Connor (1998b, Appendix, Table 1). 
These are monthly U.S. contract citric acid prices for the period of February 1990 - April 
1997 reported by Purchasing Magazine
4. This price time-series was based on monthly 
surveys of up to 500 chemical purchasing agents and buyers of bulk purchases (truck or 
tanker-car loads), f.o.b., USP grade citric acid. Contract prices are prices of supply 
contracts in force for three months, or more (usually one year). For the purpose of this 
study we assume that July 1991 is the beginning date of the conspiracy and June 1995 is 
the ending date of the conspiracy
5. 
Lysine
6. We use the lysine prices reported by Connor (2000, Appendix, Table A2). 
We use the average monthly price of lysine for the U.S. market available for the period of 
January 1990 to June 1996. These prices are obtained from Exhibit C to the Plantiff’s 
Interim Report No.1 (April 29, 1996 supplement), In re Amino Acid Lysine federal class-
action suit; exhibits 61,63, 65, and 67 in U.S. v. Michael Andreas et al. For the purpose of 
                                                
3 Citric acid is a colorless, crystalline organic chemical, one of the carboxylic acids. It is present in almost all 
plants, especially citrus fruits, and in many animal tissues and fluids. It is used in many foods, confections, 
and soft drinks. Citric acid is widely used in industry as a water conditioner, cleaning polishing agent, and 
chemical intermediate.  
4 Price diagrams are presented in the appendix.  
5 Four companies pled guilty to fixing prices and output levels of citric acid in the United States, Archer 
Daniels Midland Co. (ADM), Bayer AG, Hoffmann-La Roche AG, and Jungbunzlauer AG. The last three are 
the Swiss companies. According to ADM’s plea agreement the period of the conspiracy was vaguely 
identifies as “at least as early as January 1993” and ending June 1995. The terms of this plea agreement were 
negotiated with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) before filing with the Court in October 1996. Though, 
later (1997), when DOJ filed against three Swiss conspirators, the beginning date of the conspiracy was 
specified as July 1991. Connor (1998) points out that July 1991 is a more reasonable date for the beginning of 
the conspiracy. In addition, he argues that the conspiracy had effect on the market far beyond June 1995. This 
is because the prices do not adjust to before- conspiracy levels quickly. For details on the citric acid market 
and collusion see Connor (2001). 
6 Lysine is an essential amino acid found in proteins. It is required for growth and bone development in 
children, assists in calcium absorption and maintaining the correct nitrogen balance in the body and 
maintaining lean body mass. Furthermore it is needed to produce antibodies, hormones, enzymes, collagen 
formation as well as repair of tissue. Lysine is produce from dextrose, a sugar made from corn. Lysine is an 
important food and feed ingredient. It is widely used as a feed component in hogs, poultry and fish 
production. The technological process for lysine production was discovered in Asia in the 1960s.   10 
our study we assume the period of conspiracy as August 1992 - June 1995 excluding the 
four months of the collusion lapse in April-July 1993
7. 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistical analysis reveals some evidence of the presence of collusive behavior 
on both the citric acid and lysine markets (Table 1 and Table 2 respectively
8). The mean 
cartel price for citric acid is 75.96 cents per pound. This price is higher than the mean pre-
cartel and post-cartel prices that are 65.35 and 72.91 cents per pound respectively. The 
mean cartel price for lysine during the 1
st period of conspiracy is 90.13 cents per pound and 
is 110.30 cents per pound during the 2
nd, more effective period. The latter is higher than the 
pre-cartel and post-cartel lysine prices, which are approximately the same, 102.90 and 
102.50 cents per pound respectively. Thus, in both cases we observe a noticeable increase 
in price during the conspiracy relative to non-conspiracy periods.  
The behavior of the lysine price variance supports our expectation, i.e. it decreases 
during collusive period. In contrast, the variance of the citric acid price exhibits shifts that 
are contrary to expectations. In the citric acid case, the variance during the conspiracy is 
25.66, which is higher than the variance before or after the conspiracy. In the lysine case, 
the variance during the 2
nd period of conspiracy is 73.04 and this is lower than the variance 
during the pre-cartel, post-cartel and first cartel episode. Actually the lowest variance we 
observe is during a lapse of the lysine cartel in April – July 1993. This may be explained by 
                                                
7 Before ADM’s entry in 1991, three Asian companies, Ajinamoto, Kyowa, and Sewon Group were the major 
producers of lysine in the world and the only firms sharing the US market. They admitted they had employed 
price-fixing strategies. When ADM entered the market, world lysine prices dropped from $1.30 to $0.64 per 
pound, which was below the cost of production for all producers in the lysine market. In June 1992, ADM 
met with Asian companies representatives in Mexico City to discuss the condition of a future global 
conspiracy. Increasing prices and sharing information on prices and volumes were discussed during this 
meeting. Asian companies reached an agreement with the DOJ to plead guilty, pay fines, and cooperate in 
prosecuting ADM and its officers in August, 1996. ADM pled guilty and agreed to pay a fine in October, 
1996. Connor (2001) inclines to consider June 1992 to be the beginning date of lysine conspiracy and July 
1995 to be the termination of conspiracy that lasted a total of 36 months. August 1992 is considered to be the 
first month when the conspiracy had an effect on the market. March – July 1993 is considered to be a period 
when the conspiracy was not effective. Defendants’ plea agreements adopted a shorter conspiracy period, 
November 1993-June 1995 (Connor, 2001a). For more details on lysine market and collusion see Connor 
(2000, 2001a and 2001b). 
8 All tables are presented in appendix.    11 
the short duration of this lapse during which the remaining impact of the previous market 
price could have been strong. Another justification could be that prices observed during 
this period were almost on the same level as marginal cost (or even lower). Thus, the 
conspirators had to prevent their decrease.   
The unexpected behavior of the variance in citric acid case may be explained by the 
actual length of the conspiracy period under consideration as well as the length and 
conditions of the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The citric acid conspiracy period in our 
analysis is longer than the lysine conspiracy period, but the pre-cartel period is almost half 
as long
9. The pre-cartel period contains more variability in the prices than the post-cartel 
periods. The post-cartel variance may be low because the conspiracy market price effect 
stays on the market for a certain period of time after the conspiracy has been formally 
terminated. Also, the market price effect during the conspiracy does not take place 
immediately after the first meeting of the conspirators and their decision to collude. There 
is a period that may last several months, or even a few years, when prices are growing until 
they reach the level on which they are going to be fixed. Certainly, the variance is lower in 
the sub-period of the conspiracy when prices have reached the level on which they are 
actually being fixed. Also, the time required for the collusive agreement to affect prices 
will vary for each particular conspiracy. Other problematic issues that may impact this 
unexpected variance behavior are cartel discipline and the market conditions the cartel 
operates in (as we discussed earlier). So, under certain circumstances it may be expected 
that the variance of the price during conspiracy is higher than the variance of the price 
when there is no conspiracy. Also, it is known that the lysine conspiracy was effective in 
terms of cartel discipline enforcement. The cartel participants followed their agreement in 
approximately 90 percent of all cases (Connor, 2001a). 
                                                
9 The choice of the length of the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods is totally determined by the number of the 
available observations.    12 
From the descriptive statistical analysis we also note additional features of the price 
behavior that may indicate the presence of collusion. In the case of citric acid, the post-
cartel price is kept on a level close to the cartel price and is higher than the pre-cartel price. 
Also, the variance during the post-cartel period is very small. In the lysine case although 
the post-cartel price is approximately at the same level as the pre-cartel price, the variance 
of the former is less than half the variance of the latter. This supports the hypothesis that 
market price effect of the conspiracy stays on the market for a certain period of time and 
does not disappear immediately. This happens because conspirators cannot control all 
market forces and the long-term contract provisions are in force. In addition an expected 
antitrust indictment followed by civil suit may encourage conspirators to continue to 
influence prices but in more relax way
10. In summary, the presence of these factors that 
may affect the price variance highlights the need to use dynamic models of conditional 
heteroscedasticity like the ARCH and GARCH models. 
 
Results 
Citric Acid. Using the ARCH test we reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at a p-
value equal to 0.0000
11. The conclusion of this test is the same if we repeat it for any model 
including from 1 to 15 lags. Also, we use the modified Box-Pierce (Ljung-Box-Pierce) 
statistic to test for the presence of serial autocorrelation in the residuals and the square 
residuals (variances) obtained from the OLS regression
12. Q(1) for the model with the first 
lag only is 79.92 and has a p-value equal to 0.0000. Q(2)-Q(20) are statistically significant 
                                                
10 Sproul (1993) analyzed the effect of antitrust prosecution on prices charged by firms indicted for price-
fixing. Using the survey of 25 cases filed between 1973 and 1984 he found that prices increased by 
approximately 7 percent over the four years following an indictment.  
11 ARCH test is based on the Lagrange multiplier principle. LM statistic = N*R2, where N is the number of 
observations and R2 is a goodness-of-fit statistic from the regression of the squared residuals on a constant 
and q lagged values of the squared residuals. This statistics has Chi-Square distribution with q degrees of 
freedom.  
12 Modified Box-Pierce (Ljung-Box-Pierce) statistic has a Chi-Square distribution with the number of degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of the lags included in the model. Q(1) is the statistic based on the model 
with one lag.     13 
at the same level of significance. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of uncorrelated 
mean price changes. The same procedure applied to the squared residuals reveals similar 
results. The Ljung-Box-Pierce statistics for the models including up to the first twenty lags 
are statistically significant at p-values equal to 0.0000. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity. This suggests that ARCH and GARCH models may be suitable for 
describing the error process. To choose the order of the AR process for the ARCH and the 
GARCH mean equations we use the Akaike (AIC) and Swartz (SC) information criteria
13. 
We concentrate on the evaluation of these criteria for the models including up to the first 
four lags
14. Both AIC and SC are minimized when one lagged variable is included in the 
model. Thus, we use the AR(1) specification for the mean equation in the ARCH and the 
GARCH models. 
Lysine. To investigate the autocorrelation structure of the lysine prices we use the 
same procedure as in the case of citric acid
15. The outcomes of the ARCH and Ljung-Box-
Pierce tests applied to the residuals and squared residuals are similar to those of citric 
acid
16. The statistics along with their significance levels are close in both cases. The final 
conclusion is that we reject the null hypotheses of uncorrelated price changes and 
homoscedasticity for lysine prices as well. As for the order of the AR process, AIC is 
minimized for the model with only one lag and SC is minimized for the model with two 
                                                
13 Under the standard Dickey-Fuller unit root test, we fail to reject the unit root hypothesis for models with 1-
9 lags. However, as first noted by Perron (1989), the presence of mean or trend shift can alter the outcome of 
the unit root test. Following Perron, we conduct the unit root test with shifts in mean and trend during the pre-
cartel, cartel, and post-cartel regimes. The Dickey-Fuller test statistic is -6.05, and the simulated critical value 
is -4.76 at 10 percent level. Therefore, we reject a unit root.  
14 Due to the limited number of the observations available and the econometric technique employed we can 
consider only a limited number of lagged variables to estimate the ARCH and GARCH models. 
15 In contrast to the citric acid case we reject a unit root when one or two lagged lysine prices are included in 
the model. For example, the Dickey-Fuller statistic and augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic for the model with 
one lag are –3.6277 and –3.6027 while critical values of t-statistics are –2.57 and –3.13 respectively.   
16 In the lysine case, the ARCH LM test statistic is statistically significant with a p-value equal to 0.0000 for 
all models including up to 17 lags. The Ljung-Box-Pierce statistics are statistically significant for 
Q(1)…Q(20) both in the case of the residuals and the squared residuals.    14 
lags. Thus, both AR(1) and AR(2) are potential candidates, and we estimate both of them 
and discuss the model that performs best.    
Maximum likelihood estimation results for the ARCH and the GARCH models are 
presented in Table 3 and Table 4 for the citric acid case and in Table 5 and Table 6 for the 
lysine case. We present the ARCH(1) and the GARCH(1,1) results. Estimates of the higher 
order ARCH models showed that higher order lagged squared error terms were not 
statistically significant and did not satisfy the stationarity constraints. Similar outcomes 
were observed when alternatives to the GARCH(1,1) model specifications were estimated. 
In addition, we had numerical problems with estimation of the GARCH(2,2) and higher 
order GARCH models. Thus, we present and discuss the estimation results for the 
ARCH(1) and the GARCH(1,1) models. In each product case we estimated three different 
specifications of our model with different combinations of independent variables in the 
mean and the variance equations (see Tables 3-6).  
Citric Acid. All estimated coefficients in the ARCH(1) models satisfy the 
stationarity constraints. Model [1] is estimated as an ARCH(1) model with lagged price and 
a constant as the explanatory variables. The lagged squared error term in the variance 
equation is positive as required by sufficient stationarity constraint and has a p-value of 
0.3520. Model [2] includes a conspiracy dummy variable and its interaction with the lagged 
price in the mean equation. The estimated coefficients for these two variables have 
acceptable p-values. The estimated coefficient for the conspiracy dummy variable is 8.81 
and has a p-value equal to 0.1090. The interaction effect has a small magnitude and a p-
value equal to 0.1760. Given this specification of the mean equation, the lagged square 
error term becomes more statistically significant than in Model [1], and has similar 
magnitude. Finally, we incorporated the conspiracy dummy variable in the variance 
equation as well (Model [3]) to control for the hypothesized shift in the variance induced   15 
by collusion. Thus, the estimation results for Model [3] are those we discuss in greater 
detail.  
The estimated coefficient for the conspiracy dummy variable in the mean equation 
is 9.15 and has a p-value equal to 0.0880. The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
effect of conspiracy dummy variable and lagged price is –0.11 and has a p-value equal to 
0.1450. Both estimated coefficients are statistically significant at acceptable Type 1 error 
probability. Thus, the mean price of citric acid during collusion is 9.04 cents per pound 
higher than the mean price during the period when there is no collusion, which is 
represented by the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The estimated effect of conspiracy on 
the mean price is similar to the effect discussed earlier in the descriptive analysis section. 
The estimation results for the variance equation show that the lagged squared error term 
has a p-value of 0.3130 only, which does not suggest a highly statistically significant 
impact of the past squared error terms on the present squared error term. The positive 
magnitude of this coefficient suggests that the higher is the squared error term yesterday, 
the higher is the squared error term today. The estimated coefficient for the conspiracy 
dummy variable in the variance equation is 1.49 and has a p-value equal to 0.1340. The 
positive effect of the conspiracy on the variance is not what we hypothesized. But this 
result is consistent with the variance analysis using descriptive statistic.  
The estimation results for the mean equation in the GARCH(1,1) model are similar 
in magnitude and statistical significance to the estimation results for the mean equation in 
the ARCH(1) model. The squared error term has a stronger statistical effect in the 
GARCH(1,1) model than in the ARCH(1) model. Its estimated coefficient is positive and 
has a p-value of 0.0870. The estimated coefficient for the lagged conditional variance is 
negative and has a p-value of 0.0710. This suggests that higher values of past conditional 
variance generate lower values of present conditional variance. The estimated coefficient   16 
for the conspiracy dummy variable is positive, as in the ARCH(1) variance equation, and is 
not statistically significant with a p-value equal to 0.2900. Thus, in the case of citric acid, 
the estimation results confirm the hypothesis that the conspiracy results in the statistically 
significant price increase and they show different from the expected effect of the 
conspiracy on the variance behavior.   
Lysine. To examine the impact of the lysine conspiracy on price behavior we used 
methods similar to the citric acid case. According to the estimation results, the ARCH(1) 
effect is stronger and the GARCH(1,1) is weaker in the case of the lysine conspiracy than 
in the case of the citric acid conspiracy. In the ARCH(1) case the estimated coefficient for 
the lagged squared error term is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
all three models. The estimated coefficient for the conspiracy dummy variable in the mean 
equation is 25.73 and has a p-value of 0.0000. The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
effect between the conspiracy dummy variable and the lagged price is negative and has a p-
value equal to 0.0000 as well. The ARCH(1) estimation results suggest that the lysine 
conspiracy increased the price by 25.52 cents per pound. In the variance equation the 
estimated coefficient for the conspiracy dummy variable is negative as expected, but it is 
not statistically significant with a p-value equal to 0.2190. The estimation results obtained 
using the GARCH(1,1) procedure show similar magnitude and direction of effect in the 
estimated coefficients. According to the GARCH(1,1) estimation results the conspiracy 
effect on the market price was 24.59 cents per pound. The lagged squared error term is 
statistically significant at an acceptable level. The lagged conditional variance is not 
statistically significant at an acceptable Type 1 error probability. In summary, in the case of 
lysine we find support for both hypotheses. The mean price was higher and the variance 
was lower during conspiracy periods relative to the periods when this conspiracy was not 
effective.    17 
Conclusion 
We used extensions of traditional ARCH and GARCH models to examine the difference in 
the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution (mean and variance) during 
collusive and non-collusive periods using prices from two recently discovered conspiracies, 
citric acid and lysine. We expect that successful collusion increases the mean price and 
decreases its variance relative to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. Thus, the change in 
the price behavior confirmed by the changes in the first two moments of the price 
distribution may indicate the presence of collusive behavior on the market.   
For the lysine prices we find support for both the mean and variance hypotheses. 
Citric acid prices support the mean price hypothesis and fail to support the variance 
hypothesis. The citric acid conspiracy resulted in a statistically significant price increase of 
approximately 9 cents per pound relative to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The 
lysine conspiracy managed to raise the price by approximately 25 cents per pound relative 
to the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods and a sub-period when the conspiracy was not 
effective. In addition, the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower than 
the variance of prices during the pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. In contrast, the variance 
of the citric acid prices during the conspiracy was higher relative to the pre-cartel and post-
cartel periods. There may be at least two explanations for the unexpected variance 
behavior. First, the length of the citric acid conspiracy is longer than the lysine conspiracy. 
Thus, it could be more difficult for the cartel to supervise and enforce cartel discipline 
during longer period of time. Possible opportunistic behavior of cartel members could 
contribute to the variability in citric acid prices. In the lysine case we know that this 
conspiracy was successful; cartel members followed the discipline in 90 percent of all 
cases. Second, the data availability problem may have had an impact on the analysis 
outcome. The number of available pre-cartel observations in the citric acid case is almost   18 
half the number of available pre-cartel observations in the lysine case and less than the 
number of observations available for the cartel period. Thus, prices may appear to be more 
volatile during conspiracy.  
The results of our study have implications for both antirust policy and court 
decision-making dealing with illegal cartel conduct. In particular, the econometric 
technique employed can be used to test for the presence of collusive behavior in markets 
where collusion is likely to take place. Thus, it may be used in the screening analysis 
conducted by antitrust authorities. It may be also used as an alternative to the econometric 
models commonly employed in court proceedings to quantify the effect of conspiracy on 
market price. An advantage of using the ARCH and GARCH models is that they require 
relatively small samples of the price for a cartelized product before, during and after the 
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 Chart 2.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Citric Acid Prices 
 
Period N  Mean    Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Pre-Cartel       
02/90-6/91  17  65.35 20.24 0.65 -0.92 
Cartel       
07/91-06/95 48  75.96  25.66  -1.41  1.62 
Post-Cartel       
07/95-04/97 22  72.91  4.09  0.33  -0.41 
Sample                





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Lysine Prices 
 
Period N  Mean  Variance  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Pre-Cartel       
01/90-07/92 31  102.90  263.22  -0.70  0.16 
1st period       
08/92-03/93 8  90.13  96.70  -1.43  1.71 
Cartel lapse       
04/93-07/93 4  70.50  59.67  -0.17  -4.41 
2nd period        
08/93-06/95 23  110.30  73.04  -0.94  1.01 
Post-Cartel       
07/95-06/96 12  102.50  90.45  -0.22  -1.66 
Sample                
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood ARCH (1) Estimation Results: Citric Acid 
 
Estimated Coefficient  Model [1]  Model [2]  Model [3] 
Mean equation 
dependent variable: price     
Intercept  3.74 2.23 2.22 
st.error  2.58 4.02 3.45 
p-value  0.1480 0.5790 0.5200 
Lagged  price  (LP)  0.95 0.96 0.96 
st.error  0.04 0.06 0.05 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conspiracy dummy (DC)    8.81 9.15 
st.error   5.49  5.36 
p-value   0.1090  0.0880 
LP*DC    -0.10 -0.11 
st.error   0.08  0.07 
p-value   0.1760  0.1450 
Variance equation 
dependent variable: squared error 
Intercept  3.40 2.85 2.06 
st.error  0.70 0.59 0.61 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
Lagged squared error   0.14  0.16  0.15 
st.error  0.15 0.15 0.15 
p-value  0.3520 0.2780 0.3130 
Conspiracy dummy      1.49 
st.error     0.99 
p-value     0.1340 
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood GARCH (1,1) Estimation Results: Citric Acid 
 
Estimated Coefficient  Model [1]  Model [2]  Model [3] 
Mean equation       
dependent variable: price    
Intercept  3.99 2.45 2.84 
st.error  2.53 3.92 3.33 
p-value  0.1150 0.5330 0.3940 
Lagged  price  (LP)  0.95 0.96 0.95 
st.error  0.03 0.06 0.05 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conspiracy dummy (DC)    8.58 9.00 
st.error   5.22  4.78 
p-value   0.1000  0.0600 
LP*DC    -0.10 -0.10 
st.error   0.07  0.07 
p-value   0.1670  0.1100 
Variance equation     
dependent variable: conditional variance 
Intercept  6.11 4.82 3.33 
st.error  2.57 1.60 1.18 
p-value  0.0170 0.0030 0.0050 
Lagged  squared  error  0.09 0.15 0.23 
st.error  0.10 0.11 0.13 
p-value  0.3430 0.1850 0.0870 
Lagged conditional 
variance  -0.68 -0.61 -0.49 
st.error  0.56 0.37 0.27 
p-value  0.2250 0.0950 0.0710 
Conspiracy dummy     1.27 
st.error     1.20 
p-value     0.2900 
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood ARCH (1) Estimation Results: Lysine 
 
Estimated Coefficient  Model [1]  Model [2]  Model [3] 
Mean equation       
dependent variable: price    
Intercept 22.07  -6.58  -5.71 
st.error  2.89 4.65 4.60 
p-value  0.0000 0.1570 0.2150 
Lagged  price  (LP)  0.80 1.05 1.04 
st.error  0.03 0.04 0.04 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conspiracy dummy (DC)    27.24 25.73 
st.error   6.15  5.66 
p-value   0.0000  0.0000 
LP*DC    -0.23 -0.21 
st.error   0.06  0.05 
p-value   0.0000  0.0000 
Variance equation    
dependent variable: squared error  
Intercept 6.31  10.97  12.12 
st.error  2.31 2.96 3.92 
p-value  0.0060 0.0000 0.0020 
Lagged squared error   0.99  0.65  0.76 
St.error  0.26 0.23 0.25 
p-value  0.0000 0.0050 0.0020 
Conspiracy dummy     -5.82 
st.error     4.74 
p-value     0.2190 
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Table 6. Maximum Likelihood GARCH (1,1) Estimation Results: Lysine 
 
Estimated Coefficient  Model [1]  Model [2]  Model [3] 
Mean equation 
dependent variable: price     
Intercept 22.01  -6.30  -5.19 
st.error  2.91 4.65 4.51 
p-value  0.0000 0.1750 0.2500 
Lagged  price  (PL)  0.80 1.05 1.04 
st.error  0.03 0.04 0.04 
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Conspiracy dummy (DC)    26.88 24.79 
st.error   6.10  5.47 
p-value   0.0000  0.0000 
PL*DC    -0.22 -0.20 
st.error   0.06  0.05 
p-value   0.0000  0.0000 
Variance equation    
dependent variable: conditional variance    
Intercept 6.26  11.55  13.10 
st.error  2.62 4.15 5.01 
p-value  0.0170 0.0050 0.0090 
Lagged  squared  error  0.99 0.66 0.79 
st.error  0.28 0.24 0.25 
p-value  0.0000 0.0060 0.0020 
Lagged conditional 
variance 0.003  -0.03  -0.04 
st.error  0.08 0.13 0.10 
p-value  0.9670 0.8400 0.7200 
Conspiracy dummy     -6.66 
st.error     4.95 
p-value     0.1780 
LLF  -232.772 -230.221 -229.726 
 




    
 
 